Report: Dutch communications infrastructure is sound, but under pressure

The Dutch digital communications infrastructure is of a relatively high standard, but its resilience is coming under growing pressure. That is the conclusion of the Cyber Security Raad (CSR) in an advisory report presented on Thursday, 9 July 2026. The CSR points to a world that has become less safe and less predictable, with direct consequences for the continuity of critical digital services in the Netherlands.

The report is partly based on research conducted by TNO at the CSR's request into the resilience of the communications infrastructure, with specific attention to service continuity. In addition, researchers Freddy Dezeure and Paul Timmers carried out a supplementary study, titled 'Nederlandse Strategische Autonomie en Cybersecurity' (Dutch Strategic Autonomy and Cybersecurity), also commissioned by the CSR.

From espionage to sabotage

A notable signal in the report comes from the intelligence and security services. The AIVD, the MIVD and the NCTV jointly state that the nature of the threat has changed. It is no longer solely a matter of espionage, they write, but increasingly also one of active preparation for the sabotage of critical infrastructure.

That shift has implications for how the Netherlands designs and secures its digital infrastructure. Whereas espionage is generally aimed at gathering information undetected, sabotage is intended to disrupt or disable systems. This places different demands on network resilience and on the detection of malicious activity within those networks.

The three services have combined their threat analyses to present a shared picture, indicating that the concerns are broadly held within the Dutch security community.

Strategic autonomy as a point of attention

The study by Dezeure and Timmers focuses specifically on strategic autonomy in relation to cybersecurity. The subject connects to a broader European debate: to what extent is the Netherlands, and Europe as a whole, dependent on foreign parties for critical digital components and services?

In this context, strategic autonomy does not mean that the Netherlands must build or supply everything itself, but rather that sufficient control and visibility exists over the systems on which vital processes run. The dependence on a small number of large, predominantly non-European technology suppliers is a recurring point of concern in both national and European policy debates.

The CSR explicitly links this issue to the state of the Dutch communications infrastructure. If the underlying technology or supply chain falls outside one's own sphere of control, it becomes more difficult to respond quickly and adequately to disruptions or attacks.

Recommendations focused on continuity

The CSR makes concrete recommendations in the report to strengthen resilience, although the full details of the advisory have not been published in their entirety in the source material on which this article draws. The TNO research placed continuity of service at its core, suggesting that the recommendations include, among other things, the ability to absorb disruptions without critical communications going down.

The Cyber Security Raad is an independent strategic advisory body that advises the Dutch government and parliament on cybersecurity matters. CSR recommendations are not binding, but they carry weight in ministerial policy decisions and in the broader national cybersecurity strategy.

Relevance for the Dutch and European tech sector

For founders, investors and policymakers in the Dutch tech and AI sector, this report is relevant for more than one reason. Digital infrastructure forms the backbone on which virtually every scalable software solution or AI application runs. If the resilience of that infrastructure is under pressure, it also affects the companies and services that depend on it.

The focus on strategic autonomy aligns with European initiatives such as the EU Cyber Resilience Act and the wider debate on digital sovereignty. Dutch startups and scale-ups operating in sectors such as cloud infrastructure, network security or critical business software are therefore increasingly moving within a policy environment that places higher demands on supply chain transparency and on the robustness of the systems they build or use.